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The impact of economic freedom on the gender pay gap: evidence
from a survey of UK households
Abstract
Purpose-Using survey datasets, this work explores the impact of economic freedom
on the gender pay gap in the UK. 
Design/methodology/approach-The  analysis  combines  Economic  Freedom  of  the
World data with the Understanding Society (USoc) Microdata series 
Findings-The results document that economic freedom positively affects the gender
pay gap. When the components  of the index are considered,  the findings  indicate
different effects of various types of policy, i.e. less government spending, stronger
trade liberalization conditions and levels of corruption lead to higher gaps; stronger
legal and property rights and a sounder money system have no impact on the gap.
Moreover,  a stronger impact  in the manufacturing industry,  part-time workers and
those who work in the non-London regions is observed. 
Practical implications-The findings imply that reductions to government spending
programmes can potentially aggravate the gap in hourly wages paid between males
and females and should, therefore, be implemented. It may be also possible to provide
females the training or education necessary to effectively compete in the workforce,
before eliminating any spending programme they rely on.
Keywords: Economic freedom; Gender pay gap; UK; Survey data
JEL Classification: J31; C33
1. Introduction
There is an extensive literature examining the gender pay gap in the case of the U.S.
(Heinz and Normann, 2016; Mandel and Semyonov, 2014) offering certain competing
hypotheses that attempt to explain the presence of this gap. A strand of the literature
argues that the differential is a natural product of experience and self-selection. One
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theory implies that differences in human capital formation play a significant role in
explaining the gap (Polachek, 1981), while the relative weighting of income in utility
functions  across  genders  contributes  as  well  (Forton,  2008).  Differences  in  how
females  negotiate  wages  (Schwieren,  2012)  or  the  type  of  compensation  received
(e.g., performance based-pay) might also play a role (McGee et al., 2015). Another
strand argues that the income discrepancy is unrelated to gender characteristics and
instead is a product of discrimination (Lundberg and Startz, 1983). Moreover, Card et
al. (2016) focus on sorting and bargaining as drivers of gender income differences,
while Adda et al. (2017) show that losses in skills associated with career interruptions
and sorting are important drivers of the gender gap and relate to fertility decisions.
Blau and Kahn (2017) find that the three most important factors explaining the current
gender wage gap in the US are occupation, industry and experience.
Another factor that may influence the gender pay gap is government policy
and regulation.  Zweimüller et al.  (2008) find that ‘market oriented’ countries have
lower gender wage gaps. Stroup (2008) also finds that market economies are more
beneficial  to  gender  equality.  The  intuition  is  that  ‘market  oriented’  economies
promote  equal  opportunities  for  all  by  removing  barriers  to  entry,  which  allows
females to have access to jobs that otherwise may not have been available to them. 
In terms  of  the association  between governmental  policies  and gender  pay
gaps, the literature has recommended certain mechanisms that potentially explain this
link. More specifically, legal mechanisms aiming at minimum wage levels seem to be
crucial for a number of reasons, including most notably that females are more likely
than males to be concentrated in minimum wage jobs and in sectors where there is
limited  scope  for  collective  bargaining  (Rubery  and  Grimshaw,  2011).  Minimum
wage policies have long been recognized as a means to lift workers out of poverty,
and have also been shown to protect  female’s income and close gender pay gaps.
Bearing in mind the potential limitations of such initiatives, three issues are salient
when evaluating the role of minimum wage policies in gender equality: i) the way the
minimum wage is set, ii) the level at which the minimum wage is set, and iii) the
scope of  the  minimum wage legislation  with  respect  to  the  coverage  of  types  of
workers or organisations. In this respect, legal rights to freedom of association and
collective bargaining are essential tools for empowering females and securing their
place in information sharing, consultations and negotiations (Gernigon et al., 2000).
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Another type of such mechanisms is one of the most important features of the
gendered  division  of  labour  at  present  associated  with  the disproportionately  high
number  of  females  in  atypical  work  compared  with  males:  although  such  work
permits them to remain in the labour market, it can have a detrimental impact on their
pay, career development, promotion prospects and pensions (Ashiagbor, 2006). Forms
of work previously regarded as atypical, including part-time work, fixed-term work,
agency work,  and home working,  are  now occupying a greater  role  in  the public
policy discourse on employment regulation.
Finally, there are divergent views on the impact of trade unions and collective
bargaining as mechanisms that have favourable or detrimental impacts on the gender
pay gap. In particular, there is a growing body of evidence that labour markets with
strong systems of collective regulation are more likely to deliver gender equality than
those where collective regulation is weak and employers in charge of wage setting.
Hayter  and  Weinberg  (2011)  consider  these  ‘institutionalists’,  who recognize  that
institutions can usefully advance multiple social and economic objectives in contrast
to  the  ‘distortionists’.  Mandel  and  Shalev  (2009)  also  explore  gender  and  class
equality issues across 17 advanced economies and conclude that policies that reduce
class inequalities have favourable impacts on the aggregate gender pay gap. 
Overall,  collective regulation can be both a source of reducing gender pay
inequalities  and  establishing  and  reinforcing  gender  pay  inequalities.  The  now
extensive literature has documented the importance for gender equality of institutional
complementarity between social  welfare and gender policies  on the one hand, and
employment organisation on the other (Stier et al., 2001). Although different regime
types are likely to favour one group of females relative to another, or, females vs
males, this does not mean that action cannot be taken to try to remedy the particular
form  of  gender  pay  inequality  that  dominates  in  that  particular  institutional
environment. 
The goal of this work is to examine,  for the first time in the literature, the
relationship between government policies and the gender pay gap in the U.K. The
analysis uses the methodology by Giedeman et al. (2015) who study government’s
effects on racial income gaps. To measure government policy, the analysis uses the
Economic Freedom of the World index (EFW), interpreted as a measure of ‘market
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orientation,’; it  is a measure of regulations and policies across the country. In this
context,  a higher score in the index represents an increased reliance on individual
decision making and less governmentally imposed barriers to entry. For an extensive
review of studies using the EFW index, see Hall and Lawson (2014). The intuition
behind this area of research is that the presence of economic freedom increases the
likelihood  of  voluntary  transactions  that  are  wealth  creating.  The  key  question
relevant to this work is whether this positive association between economic freedom
and income differs  across  gender,  and thus  may either  exacerbate  or  mitigate  the
gender  income  gap.  There  are  also  reasons  to  suspect  differential  impacts  across
components, as was found by Zweimüller et al. (2008) in their cross-country analysis. 
Government  spending may also have a differing effect across each gender.
The level of government spending is thought to be a function of numerous factors,
including citizen demand (Black, 1958). Lott and Kenny (1999) hypothesize that the
increased government spending occurring in the 1930s is partly attributable to females
being granted the right to vote, as they were more likely to vote in favour of wealth
transfers than males.  This suggests government spending programmes may benefit
females  more  than  males.  Consequently,  a  reduction  in  the  government  spending
component of the index may be associated with an increase in payment for females,
and a decrease in income for males.
Becker  (1958)  argues  that  if  employers  are  discriminating,  then  these
individuals  do  not  behave  in  a  profit-maximizing  manner.  Due  to  this,  non-
discriminating  firms  will  enter  the  market  and  earn  higher  profits.  Over  time,
employers  who  discriminate  against  any  group,  including  females,  are  ultimately
pushed  out  of  the  market  by  competitive  forces.  Previous  empirical  studies  have
tested this hypothesis in specific markets (Hellerstein et al., 2002). Other research has
shown that increased globalization,  and, thus, increased competition from overseas
competitors,  further  helps  to  decrease  the  gender  wage  gap  (Autor  et  al.,  2013;
Connolly, 2017). Alternatively, a less regulated market could cause the gender wage
gap to increase. For example, assume that there are no minimum wage laws. Since
females are typically over-represented at the lower end of the wage distribution, it is
possible that these laws help to reduce the gender wage gap. Similarly, if higher levels
of government spending allow more services to be provided to females, such as day
care and other forms of child assistance, this could differentially affect females if the
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woman is more likely to stay home and take care of the children than their partner.
Zweimüller et al. (2008) consider these issues in a cross-country model, finding that
countries with more ‘market oriented’ government policies have a lower gender wage
gap. 
The analysis combines the EFW data with the Understanding Society (USoc)
Microdata  series  to  determine  the  association  between  economic  freedom,  and its
respective components, and the gap in pay between males and females in the U.K. It
also uses variables in the series as controls, including age and education, as well as
year fixed effects.  Given the years of data available  in both datasets,  the analysis
generates a panel, ranging from 2009 to 2016. When looking at economic freedom
overall, the findings show that while an increase in freedom positively affects the pay
of  both  males  and  females,  its  positive  effect  on  males  is  larger  in  magnitude.
Moreover, the disaggregated results highlight that females and males are different in
ways  that  policymakers  should  consider.  For  example,  the  findings  show  that
reductions in government expenditure programmes are associated with increases in
the pay of both males and females. Thus, it seems that females may be also dependent
on government spending programmes, implying that changing these policies needs to
be done with care. 
2. Data
The analysis makes use of two datasets. The first is the Understanding Society (USoc)
Microdata to determine the association between economic freedom, or its respective
components, and the gap in wage pay between males and females in the U.K. The
USoc database is provided by the University of Essex, the Institute for Social and
Economic Research, covering the waves 2003-2015. The database is a longitudinal
annual survey of families with all individuals across all waves remaining in the panel.
All members of the household aged 16 and above are interviewed annually, while a
set  of  demographics,  educational,  and labour-market  information  is  also recorded,
including  historical  data  on  working  hours  and  the  socio-economic  background.
Information also reports measures of hours of work for those in work. The database
includes  23,909  respondents,  while  it  considers  three  education  groups:  GCSEs,
representing  those  who  leave  education  at  16  without  completing  high  school
education, A-levels, representing those with a high-school diploma or equivalent, and
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Degree, representing those who graduate from college (3-year degree). The largest
group is that with lower education attainment,  and this is true for both males and
females. Only about 13% of our sample has a degree. Individuals who are working at
the time of the interview are asked to report their occupation and industry, and these
are  classified  using standard  classification  codes,  SOC and SIC,  respectively.  For
comparability over time, we converted all classifications into the most recent ones,
SOC2010 (3-digit) and SIC2007 (2-digit). Finally, the marital status size variable is
defined as a dummy variable that takes one for individuals with one child, two with
two children and three with three or more children. Given the years of data available
in both datasets, the analysis generates a panel, ranging from 2009 to 2016. Table I
presents summary statistics of these data. 
The second primary data set we draw upon is the Economic Freedom of the
World (EFW) index. This index measures the restrictions that are put in place by
governments. The index uses a variety of data from government and non-government
sources to assemble it,  which is based on a 0 to 10 scale, with 10 being the most
economically free. The index measure the degree of economic freedom in five broad
areas:  Size  of  Government:  government  spending,  taxation,  and  the  size  of
government-controlled  enterprises  increase,  government  decision-making  is
substituted for individual  choice and economic freedom is reduced,  Legal System
and Property Rights: protection of persons and their rightfully acquired property is a
central element of both economic freedom and civil society, Sound Money: inflation
erodes the value of rightfully earned wages and savings and sound money is thus
essential to protect property rights; when inflation is not only high but also volatile, it
becomes difficult for individuals to plan for the future and thus use economic freedom
effectively,  Freedom to Trade Internationally: freedom to exchange is essential to
economic freedom, which is  reduced when freedom to exchange does not include
businesses and individuals in other nations, and  Regulation: governments not only
use a number of tools to limit the right to exchange internationally, they may also
develop onerous regulations that limit the right to exchange, gain credit, hire or work
for whom you wish, establish minimum wage laws, or freely operate your business.
We observe more variance when examining the respective components in comparison
to variation found in the overall index. The size of government index exhibits the





Following Hoover et al. (2015), the analysis estimates the effect of higher levels of
economic freedom on the log of hourly pay, separately for males and females:
   p                   
log(hourly earnings)it = Σ β1 log(EconFreedomt-j) + β2 Xit + γ1i + γ2t + εit (1)
  j=0      
where log(hourly earnings)  represents  the log of the hourly earnings  for males  or
females i in year t, while we also consider the difference in the log of hourly earnings
between males and females (i.e., gender pay gap). The primary independent variable
of  interest  is  the  log  of  EconFreedom,  which  is  the  EFW  index.  The  baseline
regressions include the aggregate index only. Subsequent regressions include the five
major components of the EFW index. X represents other control variables, such as
age, education and marital status. Finally,  γ1i and γ2t show individual and time fixed
effects, respectively, and  εit is the error term.  The empirical analysis is carried out
through the panel GMM approach, recommended by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
The results are presented in Tables II through VII. Table II includes results
using the overall EFW index, with Tables III through VII decomposing the index into
its five components. The estimates of the control variables are reported only in Table
II, while they are dropped in the other tables due to space constraints (however, they
are available upon request). The first column of each table shows the results for the
male only sample, the second column shows the results for the female only sample,
and the final column shows the results for the difference between male and female
hourly earnings, which can be interpreted as the gender pay gap. As we see in Table
II, higher levels of economic freedom are contemporaneously associated with higher
hourly  earnings  for  both  males  and  females.  Both  coefficients  are  statistically
significant  at  the  1% level.  However,  the  association  is  larger  for  males  than  for
females, leading to an overall positive association with differences in hourly earnings
that is statistically significant. The same is also true with respect to the lagged one
index, indicating the dynamic impact of economic freedom on the gender pay gap.
Given that both variables under consideration are expressed in logs, the economic
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interpretation illustrates that an 1% contemporaneous increase in the EFW index leads
to a 0.736% increase in males’ earnings, 0.688% in females earning, and a 0.665%
increase in the pay gap. 
Overall, these results suggest that while economic freedom may be beneficial
for  both  males  and females,  it  has  a  larger  effect  on males  and,  therefore,  has  a
positive effect on the gender pay gap. Intuitively, this basic result may stem from the
fact  that  the  benefits  of  increased  economic  freedom often  comes  in  the  form of
entrepreneurial activity (Nyström 2008) and the entrepreneurship rates between males
and females are historically different (Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011). 
In  terms  of  the  remaining  control  variables,  higher  working  ages  seem to
positively  contribute  to  the  gender  pay  gap,  while  although  education  positively
contributes to the wages of both genders, it contributes more to males than to females,
and therefore,  widens the  gender  pay gap.  In  other  words,  being  older  and more
educated  indicates  an  opportunity  of  having  acquired  greater  amounts  of  human
capital,  which  justifies  the positive  effect  on wage pay in  both genders,  although
human capital in males exceeds that of females; thus, these differences in the market
value of human capital seem to lead to specialization whereby the person (males) with
the greater market earnings potential receives higher pay, while females have lower
incentives  in  the  labour  market.  Finally,  the  marital  status  also  seems  to  exert  a
positive, albeit a weakly significant,  impact on the gender pay gap, indicating that
married  males  affect  the  gap  more  than  married  females.  This  outcome  receives
support from the literature (Jordan et al., 2012). Certain studies have found evidence
of the ‘motherhood penalty’ hypothesis, i.e. females who are mothers are perceived as
less  competent  and  less  committed  to  their  organizations  compared  with  positive
stereotypes  of  fathers  who  are  viewed  as  more  committed  to  their  organizations
(King, 2008). 
Certain diagnostic tests are reported at the bottom of Table II. It is evident that
both the test for AR(2) of disturbances and the difference-in-Hansen tests fail to reject
the respective nulls. Thus, these tests support the validity of the instruments used,
while difference-in-Hansen tests imply the exogeneity of the instruments employed.
In the estimation process, eight instruments (i.e., a constant and seven lags of hourly




In the following part of the empirical analysis, we estimate the link between
the economic freedom index and the gender pay gap with a different sample period by
using  the  period  prior  and  after  the  global  financial  crisis  in  2008.  The  results,
reported in Table IIa, provide solid empirical evidence that the link has got stronger in
the regime after the crisis, implying the necessity of interventions through institutional
strengthening of the business environment.
[Table IIa here]
We next explore how the main index components affect the pay of males and
females differently in Tables III through VII. The results in Table III suggest that less
government spending is associated with increases in the pay gap. This finding could
be due to the fact that females may rely on government assistance, in terms of jobs
and  aid  programmes,  which  has  a  negative  effect  on  their  earnings.  In  addition,
females' relative skills and the degree of discrimination they face can be affected by
equal  employment  opportunity  laws  and  regulations,  as  well  as  by  government
policies directed at the difficulties of combining work and family. The presence of
government  programmes  makes  labour  appear  as  a  non-commodity  insofar  as  it
substitutes for wages, either directly by means of income transfers or indirectly by
providing free or subsidized goods and services. The key effect of this process is that
it increases workers’ reservation wages. In addition, high levels of this process tend to
stifle the growth of low-wage jobs in the private service sector (Iversen, 2005). This
sectoral dynamic also has the effect of lowering class inequality. Finally, a welfare
state reduces intraclass inequality, since in the absence of uniform social rights, part-
time and intermittent workers are more vulnerable to wage discrimination. Each one
of  these  effects  powerfully  influences  the  gender  pay  gap,  since  workers  in  the
overlapping  categories  of  low-wage,  service  and  part-time  employment  are
disproportionately female. 
By contrast, facilitation of females' employment by adjusting working time to
household demands reduces their motivation to compete with males for lucrative but
demanding  jobs  and  increases  the  motivation  of  private  employers  to  practice
statistical  discrimination against females.  Such discrimination is fed by the limited
selectivity  of  female  workers  under  conditions  of  high  female  labour  force
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participation, and by their eligibility for social rights that are rarely used by males and
which  are  perceived  as  lowering  females'  commitment  to  work.  A  one  percent
decrease in government size is associated with approximately a 0.70 percent point
increase in the pay gap. 
[Table III here]
The results in Table IV suggest that a stronger legal and property rights system
leads to increases in hourly wages paid for both females and males. The effect of this
increase  is  slightly  larger  in  magnitude  for females.  Thus,  it  is  likely  that  such a
stronger legal system and property rights has a non-significant effect on the pay gap.
The  findings  seem  to  receive  empirical  support  from  the  literature  (Geddes  and
Lueck, 2002; Fernandez, 2009). 
[Table IV here]
Next,  the  sub-component  of  sound  money,  i.e.  money  supply,  inflation,
freedom  to  own  foreign  currency  accounts,  is  directly  related  to  the  extent  of
competition  on product  markets.  For  instance,  low inflation  rates  and low money
supply growth rates are expected to have an effect on the degree of competition in the
economy.  In  turn,  according  to  Becker’s  (1957)  model  of  employer  taste
discrimination,  increased  competition  may  impact  on  the  pay  gap  by  affecting
employers’  ability  to  discriminate  against  females.  Employers  that  pay  male
employees a wage premium in order to indulge discriminatory tastes, thus accruing
additional costs, are unable to compete with others who do not have such preferences
as the opening of the product market to new entrants forces a move towards more
efficient production. Therefore,  we get a negative correlation between the level of
product market competition and employer taste discrimination, enforcing the positive
role of competition in achieving equality in gender pays. Table V clearly illustrates
that a sounder money environment increases hourly wages paid of both genders, with
the impact on the gap being again statistically insignificant. 
[Table V here] 
In reality,  trade  liberalization  is  a  multifaceted  phenomenon;  it  is  a  policy
package, consisting most importantly of reduction in tariff rates accompanied by freer
flow of foreign capital. Both these policies are likely to have concurrent effects on
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gender pay gap. The widening pay gap in some countries mainly due to fall in female
wages is often attributed to the informalisation of labour and lowering of females’
bargaining power. Since females concentrate in labour-intensive manufacturing firms
and services, their  relative bargaining power does not rise even as labour demand
increases due to globalisation, or due to the potential threat of relocation of firms to
lower wage sites.  In contrast,  males  working mainly in non-tradables  and capital-
intensive industries have more bargaining power to demand higher wages (Braunstein
and Brenner, 2007). 
There also exist  a plethora of evidence that documents persistent  and even
increasing gender pay gaps as a consequence of liberalization (Menon and Rodgers,
2009). Table VI considers the subcomponent of the freedom to trade internationally.
The results clearly show that more freedom to trade internationally clearly benefits
both  genders  in  terms  of  hourly  wages,  but  the  effect  seems  to  be  substantially
stronger for males, while it also leads to a higher, and statistically significant, pay gap.
The estimates signify that an 1% increase of the sub-index leads to an 0.51% increase
in the gender pay gap. 
[Table VI here] 
The  link  between  corruption  and  gender  pay  gaps  has  not  been  explicitly
explored  in  the  literature.  This  link  touches  the  strand  of  the  literature  that  has
investigated the impact of corruption on the wage gap between the skilled and the
unskilled,  while skilled and unskilled workers are engaged in both production and
corruption related activities (Marjit and Mandal, 2008; Marjit and Mukherjee, 2009).  
The results of this literature document that wage gaps can move up or down
with corruption depending on which sector loses less when capital cost increases with
an increase in return to capital. The impact on wages depends on the factor intensity
rankings within the ‘productive’,  as well  as the ‘corruptive’  sectors.  Lowering the
degree  of  corruption  reduces  the  size  of  the  corruption  sector,  though  wage-
distribution can go either way. This part of the analysis also relates to the literature on
earning differentials  between males and females and between public sector gender
gap and private sector gender gap, which is very limited as well. Most studies find
that the male/female earnings differential is larger in the private sector (Rosenfeld and
Kalleberg,  1998).   Panizza  (2001)  finds  that  while  corruption  and  public  sector
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efficiency  are  not  correlated  with  average  public  sector  wages  are  positively
correlated with the high-skills versus low-skills wage differential in the public sector. 
Table VII reports the results of the impact of the corruption index on gender
pay gap. The findings document that higher corruption levels exert a positive effect on
both gender hourly wages paid, as well as on the pay gap, since the effect seems to be
stronger  for  the  case  of  males.  In  economic  terms,  a  one percent  increase  of  the
corruption sub-index leads to practically 0.69 percent increase in the gender pay gap. 
[Table VII here]
4. The role of the type of the business environment
At the time of the interview, respondents also revealed the type of business
they were working in. We separate the sample based on that type of business into:
self-employed workers,  those who work in the manufacturing  industry,  those who
work in the services industry and those who work in the energy and water industry.
The results  are  shown in Table  VIII.  They document  that  the EFW index affects
positively  (and  is  statistically  significant)  the  gender  pay  gap  across  all  types  of
business, while it turns out to exert the strongest effect in magnitude terms in the case
of  the manufacturing  industry and the weaker  effect  in  the case of self-employed
workers. 
[Table VIII here]
Moreover, this part of the empirical analysis repeats the above estimations, but
this time just for the female participants. The new results, presented in Table VIIIa,
illustrate that the economic freedom index has no impact on gender pay gap in the
case of self-employment (female entrepreneurs), while it exerts a strong index in the
case of the remaining type of occupations.
[Table VIIIa here]
5. The role of the full- and part-time employment
In the next experiment, we repeat the analysis based on the full- and part-time
type of employment. High status and well-paid careers are predominantly full-time,
Sensitivity: Internal
13
highly demanding, competitive and ‘progressive’ (Evetts, 2000), with part-timers and
those with significant career ‘breaks’, in consequence, often regarded by employers as
less dedicated, less professional and more ‘time deviant’. Thus, given that significant
child rearing and other household responsibilities limit their full participation in the
labour market, females’ ability to pursue careers and their earnings potential can be
expected to be particularly constrained spatially and temporally (Jarvis et al., 2001).
The new findings are reported in Table IX. They illustrate that the EFW index has a
clear positive, strong and statistically significant effect on the gender pay gap for both
types of workers,  although is  more substantial  for those who work on a part-time
basis. 
[Table IX here]
6. The London factor
In this final section of the empirical analysis, we divide our sample into those
who work in the London area and those in other regions. The results are reported in
Table X. A clear feature of these findings is that the regional gender-pay-gap effect of
not working in London is much larger than that of working in the London area. Such
findings  seem  to  support  theories  of  reduced  labour  mobility  within  the  female
workforce, which leads to labour supply imbalances and, therefore, reduced earnings
in certain areas (namely, all but London). It seems that London has a much larger and
integrated job market than other regions, and hence, it is likely to lessen gender pay
gap issues. 
[Table X here]
Finally, this part of the analysis considers the type of occupation used for the purposes
of  deriving  the  results  reported  in  Table  VIII  (i.e.,  self-employed  workers,
manufacturing,  services,  and  energy  and  water)  to  determine  whether  there  are
specific sectors of activity that are immune to the London effect. The new results are
presented in Table XI and they clearly highlight the similarity of the results presented
previously,  thus,  lending  further  support  to  this  effect,  irrespectively  the  type  of





This paper examined the effect of government policy towards markets on the pay gap
between males and females. The findings documented that a more market oriented
(less regulated) economic environment was positively associated with the pay of both
genders.  However,  the  positive  association  seemed  to  be  larger  in  magnitude  for
males.  When  it  disaggregated  the  index,  the  results  highlighted  that  decreases  in
government  spending,  more  freedom to  trade  internationally  and more  corruption
were statistically associated with increases in the gender pay discrepancy. The results
also indicated that there was a strong impact on the gender pay gap for those working
in the manufacturing  industry,  the part-time workers and those in the UK regions
outside of London.
The findings have also important practical implications for understanding the
mechanisms that  give rise to the gender pay gap. In particular,  there are practical
implications for the role of policies facilitating economic freedom in businesses in
gender  pay  differences.  For  instance,  the  results  are  expected  to  carry  significant
implications  on  the  future  growth  of  women-led  businesses.  Consequently,  the
findings point to potential indirect effects of gender in the growth modelling, arguing
that  female  entrepreneurs  could  potentially  start  their  business  ventures  with  less
capital  than  males  and  this  is  expected  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  high-growth
enterprises.  In  addition,  the  results  could  be  interpreted  as  an  indication  of  the
introduction of an additional element of selection. The direction of such selection is
unclear a priori; however, it seems reasonable when the analysis usually focuses on
high-level, traditionally male-oriented professions. If this is the case, then studies of
such occupational  subgroups will  understate  the extent  of discrimination.  Female's
relative skills and the degree of discrimination they face can be affected by equal
employment  opportunity  laws  and regulations,  as  well  as  by  government  policies
directed at the difficulties of combining work and family. Such government policies
could emphasize the important role for wage structure in determining how females




The results  also  point  to  evidence  associated  with  the  development  of  the
concept  and implications  of  identity,  defined  as  a  sense  of  belonging  to  a  social
category, combined with a view about how people who belong to that category should
behave.  Departures from these norms are perceived as generating costs  and hence
people seek to avoid them. 
Furthermore, given male’s and female’s differing skill levels and locations in
the  economy  (by  occupation,  industry,  and  firm),  a  better  organized  economic
freedom business environment can have a significant effect on the gender pay gap. In
particular, the more compressed pay/wage structures due to the greater role of unions
and other centralized pay setting institutions have served to lower the gender pay gap
by  bringing  up  the  bottom  of  the  pay  distribution.  This  evidence  could  become
increasingly relevant to the UK as minimum wage hikes, some quite substantial, are
being contemplated at many levels of government.
The  findings  with  respect  to  the  sub-component  of  the  economic  freedom
index in relevance  to  corruption,  also imply  that  according to  the marginalization
theory, females are on average, often excluded from positions and decision-making
areas where greed corruption is likely to occur. It is therefore expected that female’s
perception  of  this  type  of  corruption  to  be in  fact  lower  than male’s  perceptions.
Gaining a closer understanding of gender pay differences in perceptions of different
forms of corruption may hold the key to a closer understanding of how and why the
demand  for  anticorruption  reforms  differs  across  certain  segments  of  a  country’s
population. 
Finally, there are substantial practical implications in a sense that persistent
gender payment gaps indicate gender differences in occupations and industries as the
most important measurable factors explaining these gender wage gap. Thus, gender
differences  in  location  in  the  labour  market  remains  exceedingly  relevant.  The
continued  importance  of  gender  differences  in  employment  by  industry  and
occupation,  as well as by firm, suggest the fruitfulness of research aimed at better
understanding  the  underlying  reasons  for  these  gender  difference  as  well  as  their
consequences, as well as providing better recommendations for the needed policies




The key message is  that gender  pay equity needs to  be pursued through a
policy  package  that  promotes  inclusive  and  transparent  labour  market,  alongside
specific  measures  to  address  gender  pay equity.  Initiatives  to  improve the pay of
females within specific firms or organisations may have limited effects, if these firms
are able  to outsource work to  lower paying firms or if  gender  equity  is  achieved
within the workplace through downgrading of pay for males as collective regulation is
weakened or abolished. Strengthening and extending employment standards, through
higher  minimum  wages,  more  equal  rights  for  workers  and  more  extensive  and
inclusive collective bargaining need to be combined with effective and new gender
specific  measures  to  address  the  undervaluation  of  female’s  work,  not  limited  to
measures which focus on within firm comparisons with males, and to build on the
essential individual legal rights to equal treatment by extending duties on employers
actively to promote gender equality. To bring these two elements together and widen
support  and understanding  of  gender  pay equity  policies,  consideration  should  be
given to generalising a right to fair pay and equal pay for work of equal value within
an  employing  organisation  to  increase  awareness  and  understanding,  though  this
should  not  be  allowed  to  detract  from  efforts  to  remedy  the  undervaluation  of
female’s work.
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Table I. Summary statistics
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
        Males                   Females
Variable Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Pay 12.34 3.88 8.69 14.48 10.85 3.96 5.37 13.52
(in hourly earnings by working-time)
Age 41.7 14.39 25.2 55.0 41.9 12.46 25.4 55.0
Education 0.38 0.12 0.29 0.43 0.27 0.11 0.18 0.36
Marital status 58.29% 0.09 43.58% 66.81% 55.16% 0.08 40.18% 63.48%
Males 11,346 No. of observations  79,422
Females 12,563 No. of observations 87,941
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable Mean SD Min Max
______________________________________________________________________
EFW Index 7.96 0.07 6.89 8.08
Size of government 5.60 0.25 4.32 6.04
Sensitivity: Internal
22
Legal system and property rights 7.90 0.07 6.81 7.98
Sound money 9.70 0.13 8.50 9.84
Freedom to trade internationally 8.54 0.18 7.27 8.78




Table II.  The role of economic freedom in the gender pay gap: The overall EFW
index
_____________________________________________________________________
Variables Males Females Gender gap
_____________________________________________________________________




Age 0.029** 0.025** 0.023**
[0.03] [0.04] [0.05]
Education 0.037*** 0.028*** 0.026***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Marital status 0.024* 0.015* 0.014*
[0.06] [0.08] [0.08]
Diagnostics
R2  0.64  0.61 0.61
AR(2)  [0.38]  [0.49] [0.34]
Difference Hansen test [0.78]  [0.86] [0.61]
No. Of observations  79,422            87,941          167,363
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes:  The number of lags in the Economic Freedom variable was determined through the Akaike
criterion. AR(2) is the test for autocorrelation of order 2. Hansen is the test for the overidentification
check  for  the  validity  of  instruments.  The difference-in-Hansen  test  checks  the  exogeneity  of  the
instruments.  Figures  in  brackets  denote  p-values.  *:  p≤0.10;  ***:  p≤0.01.  All  estimations  were
performed under fixed effects and with time dummies.
Sensitivity: Internal
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Table IIa.  The role of economic freedom in the gender pay gap: The overall EFW
index-The role of the 2008 global financial crisis
_____________________________________________________________________
Variables Males Females Gender gap
_____________________________________________________________________
Before the 2008 global financial crisis regime





R2  0.55  0.52 0.54
AR(2)  [0.36]  [0.45] [0.32]
Difference Hansen test [0.72]  [0.80] [0.54]
No. Of observations  33,186            39,075            82,261
After the 2008 global financial crisis regime





R2  0.68  0.65 0.64
AR(2)  [0.42]  [0.53] [0.38]
Difference Hansen test [0.82]  [0.89] [0.65]
No. Of observations  46,236            48,866            85,102
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: As in Table II.
Sensitivity: Internal
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Table III. The role of economic freedom in the gender pay gap (government size)
_____________________________________________________________________











R2  0.57  0.53 0.54
AR(2)  [0.40]  [0.52] [0.39]
Difference Hansen test [0.82]  [0.89] [0.65]
No. Of observations  79,422            87,941          167,363
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: As in Table II. 
Sensitivity: Internal
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Table IV.  The role of economic freedom in the gender pay gap (legal system and
property rights)
_____________________________________________________________________
Variables Males Females        Gender gap
_____________________________________________________________________
log(Economic Freedom) (Legal system and property rights)
0.603*** 0.616*** 0.597***
[0.01] [0.00] [0.01]




R2  0.57  0.53 0.54
AR(2)  [0.40]  [0.52] [0.39]
Difference Hansen test [0.82]  [0.89] [0.65]
No. Of observations  79,422 87,941          167,363
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: As in Table II. 
Sensitivity: Internal
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Table V. The role of economic freedom in the gender pay gap (sound money)
_____________________________________________________________________










R2  0.52  0.48 0.53
AR(2)  [0.44]  [0.56] [0.42]
Difference Hansen test [0.84]  [0.84] [0.64]
No. Of observations  79,422 87,941          167,363
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: As in Table II. 
Sensitivity: Internal
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Table VI.  The role of economic freedom in the gender pay gap (freedom to trade
internationally)
_____________________________________________________________________
Variables Males Females Gender gap
_____________________________________________________________________
log(EconomicFreedom) (Freedom to trade internationally)
0.595*** 0.559*** 0.507***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01]




R2  0.58  0.53 0.56
AR(2)  [0.46]  [0.53] [0.45]
Difference Hansen test [0.81]  [0.80] [0.62]
No. Of observations  79,422 87,941 167,363
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: As in Table II. 
Sensitivity: Internal
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Table VII. The role of economic freedom in the gender pay gap (corruption)
_____________________________________________________________________









R2  0.63  0.57 0.59
AR(2)  [0.48]  [0.50] [0.49]
Difference Hansen test [0.77]  [0.83] [0.67]
No. Of observations  79,422 87,941 167,363
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: As in Table II.  
Sensitivity: Internal
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Table VIII. The role of economic freedom in the gender pay gap-type of business: The general EFW index
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variables Self-employed workers        Manufacturing             Services     Energy and water
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
log(EconomicFreedom) 0.475* 0.646*** 0.579*** 0.548***
[0.06] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
log(EconomicFreedom)-1  0.241* 0.273*** 0.214*** 0.192**
[0.08] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02]
Diagnostics
R2 0.54 0.68 0.62 0.58
AR(2)  [0.38] [0.43] [0.46] [0.41]
Difference Hansen test [0.61] [0.67] [0.62] [0.55]
No. of observations  29,295 89,236 39,879  8,953
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: As in Table II. 
Sensitivity: Internal
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Table VIIIa. The role of economic freedom in the gender pay gap-type of business: The general EFW index and female participants
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Female participants
Variables Self-employed workers        Manufacturing             Services     Energy and water
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
log(EconomicFreedom) 0.184 0.905*** 0.763*** 0.814***
[0.13] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
log(EconomicFreedom)-1  0.063 0.408*** 0.346*** 0.397***
[0.21] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Diagnostics
R2 0.37 0.75 0.69 0.64
AR(2)  [0.43] [0.46] [0.48] [0.45]
Difference Hansen test [0.64] [0.71] [0.66] [0.59]
No. of observations  24,684 35,398 23,977  5,882
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: As in Table ΙΙ. 
Sensitivity: Internal
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Table IX.  The role of economic freedom in the gender pay gap (full- vs part-time
employment): The overall EFW index
_____________________________________________________________________







R2  0.59  0.56
AR(2)  [0.49]  [0.54]
Difference Hansen test [0.68]  [0.76]
No. Of observations  105,549 61,814
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: As in Table ΙΙ. 
Sensitivity: Internal
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Table X. The role of economic freedom in the gender pay gap (the London factor):
The overall EFW index
_____________________________________________________________________







R2  0.66  0.57
AR(2)  [0.58]  [0.48]
Difference Hansen test [0.75]  [0.59]
No. Of observations  94,217 73,146
_____________________________________________________________________
Notes: As in Table ΙΙ. 
Sensitivity: Internal
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Table XI. The role of economic freedom in the gender pay gap-type of business: The general EFW index-The London factor by occupation
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variables Self-employed workers        Manufacturing             Services     Energy and water
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Working in London
log(EconomicFreedom) 0.613*** 0.639*** 0.602*** 0.591***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
log(EconomicFreedom)-1  0.277* 0.296** 0.275** 0.249*
[0.06] [0.04] [0.04] [0.07]
Diagnostics
R2 0.57 0.71 0.65 0.60
AR(2)  [0.40] [0.47] [0.51] [0.44]
Difference Hansen test [0.64] [0.65] [0.60] [0.58]
No. of observations  20,951 33,822 34,137  5,305
Working in other regions
log(EconomicFreedom) 0.832*** 0.861*** 0.784*** 0.790***
Sensitivity: Internal
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[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
log(EconomicFreedom)-1  0.382** 0.404** 0.368** 0.327**
[0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.05]
Diagnostics
R2 0.62 0.76 0.69 0.64
AR(2)  [0.46] [0.53] [0.56] [0.50]
Difference Hansen test [0.68] [0.67] [0.64] [0.63]
No. of observations  16,138 26,927 26,093  3,988
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: As in Table II
